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INTRODUCTION
Justifications put forward by the United States government when it uses
military force abroad are almost never directly confronted in the courts.1
Separation of powers under the U.S. Constitution has led to significant
debate throughout the country’s history regarding who has the power to act
and whether that action can be reviewed by a coordinate branch.2 Since 2014,
this debate has focused on the power to send U.S. forces into combat against
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).3 Largely academic up to that
point, the debate was given practical import by the U.S. government’s
decision to intervene in response to significant gains by ISIL throughout
Syria and Iraq.4 As the President sought to counter ISIL in both countries,
he lacked an explicit congressional authorization for the use of military force
(AUMF) directed at this new group. While President Barack Obama initially
claimed that his authority under Article II of the Constitution permitted him
to engage ISIL, his justification later shifted to the 2001 AUMF originally
drafted for the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and eventually to the
2002 AUMF for Iraq as well.5
In general, legal challenges to uses of force fail, either for reasons of
standing or other justiciability rules,6 but the Supreme Court has
demonstrated a willingness to address personal liberty issues involved in
military detention cases.7 This willingness of the courts to intervene when
1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A
U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED
FORCE 10 (2011), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/doj-lethal.pdf [https://perma.cc/54MH-AN5U] (“It is
well-established that ‘[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely
proper subjects for judicial intervention’ . . . .” (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981))).
2 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (striking down a statute as
unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers delineated in the U.S. Constitution).
3 See, e.g., Olivia Gonzalez, The Pen and the Sword: Legal Justifications for the United States’ Engagement
Against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 133, 159 (2015) (noting the debate
over whether or not the President had authority to use military force against ISIL). ISIL is also known
as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
4 See Liz Sly & Ahmed Ramadan, Insurgents Seize Iraqi City of Mosul as Security Forces Flee, WASH.
POST (June 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/insurgents-seize-iraqi-city-of-mosul-astroops-flee/2014/06/10/21061e87-8fcd-4ed3-bc94-0e309af0a674_story.html?utm_term=.27960af6f993
[https://perma.cc/AFA5-UN8S] (describing ISIL’s capture of the second largest city in Iraq and its
broader territorial gains across Iraq and Syria).
5 See Jack Goldsmith, Obama’s Breathtaking Expansion of a President’s Power to Make War, TIME
(Sept. 11, 2014), http://time.com/3326689/obama-isis-war-powers-bush/ [https://perma.cc/23LC-JPLD]
(noting the shift in September 2014 of President Obama’s justification for the war against ISIL).
6 See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 285 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing for standing and
justiciability a claim challenging the war against ISIL, brought by a U.S. servicemember deployed to
Kuwait in support of that conflict); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding
that members of Congress did not have standing to challenge the 2011 military operations against Libya).
7 E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 604-05 (2004) (plurality opinion) (reaching the merits and
holding that due process requires opportunity for detainees to challenge their enemy combatant status).
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personal liberty is at stake in detention cases likely drove the U.S.
government’s decision to release a suspected ISIL fighter.
Faced with the prospect of defending in court its contention that the fight
against ISIL was authorized by either Congress or the President’s inherent
constitutional authority, the government elected to release an ISIL fighter it
had been holding in military custody in Iraq.8 In September 2017, an American
citizen known as John Doe, who had been fighting for ISIL in Syria, was
turned over to the American military.9 With the support of the ACLU, he
challenged his detention and filed a habeas petition in the District Court of
the District of Columbia.10 The government failed in its efforts to have the
case dismissed on jurisdictional grounds and was blocked by the courts from
transferring Doe to Saudi Arabia prior to a determination that it was legally
authorized to detain him. Facing a pending decision by the district court on
the merits of the habeas petition, the government released Doe in Bahrain.11
While many factors likely played into this decision by the government, the
significant risk of defeat in the courts was almost certainly a major one.
The Non-Detention Act of 1971 (NDA) notes that “[n]o citizen shall be
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress.”12 Therefore, to resolve the habeas petition the courts must
answer the question of whether or not Congress has authorized the use of
force against ISIL and, with it, the detention of American citizen combatants.
If Congress has authorized the fight and the detention, then the President is
operating at the height of his powers.13 On the other hand, if Congress has
not authorized the military detention of American citizens in the fight against
ISIL, the President will lack the authority to do so because Congress already
spoke and prohibited such an action in the NDA.14
This Comment explores how the resolution of Doe’s habeas petition
would have required the courts to address the executive branch’s authority to
wage war—a question that courts have avoided in the Post–World War II era.
This Comment will go beyond the positions outlined in the litigation in order
Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Doe v. Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-2069).
Robert Chesney, Doe v. Mattis: The Fact Dispute in the U.S. Citizen Detainee Case, LAWFARE (Feb.
20, 2018, 2:37 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/doe-v-mattis-fact-dispute-us-citizen-detainee-case
[https://perma.cc/3UU5-LWUQ]; Jenna Consigli, Prosecuting the Islamic State Fighters Left Behind by
Wednesday, LAWFARE (Aug. 1, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/prosecuting-islamic-statefighters-left-behind [https://perma.cc/295A-ZXTM].
10 See Robert Chesney, A Primer on the Legal Dispute in Doe v. Mattis, LAWFARE (Mar. 9, 2018,
8:13 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/primer-legal-dispute-doe-v-mattis [https://perma.cc/5KTBPAC7] (outlining the legal issues at play in Doe v. Mattis).
11 Stipulation of Dismissal, supra note 8, at 1.
12 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2018).
13 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
14 See 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
8
9

94

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online

[Vol. 167: 91

to establish the basis for the justiciability of this claim in the historical
context. It will also incorporate recent legal writing and judicial opinions
trending towards the normalization of foreign policy to apply a standard of
deference that does not cede the field to the executive branch, though it still
recognizes judicial tendencies towards deference in ambiguous contexts. In
doing so, this Comment seeks to address the full scope of the justifications
put forward for the fight against ISIL and evaluate the likely outcome the
government would have considered if it had to defend its justification for the
war against ISIL in court.
Part I of this Comment will explore the factual background of Doe’s
capture and the progression of his case15 before going into Part II, which argues
that the courts would have found this a justiciable question. Part III examines
potential sources of congressional authority for the war against ISIL, including
the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs and congressional appropriations. Finally, Part IV
rejects the executive branch’s claim that it has independent authority to initiate
hostilities against ISIL; to the degree that the executive does have that power,
Congress’s passage of the NDA still would have prohibited the indefinite
detention of Doe. With the government lacking legal justification for the war
against ISIL and facing the prospect of a judicial decision declaring that fact,
the government instead chose to release the fighter.
Finally, this analysis maintains its relevance with the continued captures
and detention of U.S. citizens by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).16
Contrary to the experience with John Doe, the U.S government quickly
15 While not the focus of this Comment, the government originally attempted to release Doe
back into Syria. Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His Application for a Preliminary
Injunction & Response to Respondent’s Supplemental Memorandum at 1, Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195
(No. 17-2069). Doe opposed this release into a “dangerous and war-torn country,” id., before the issue
was mooted by his release into Bahrain and the dismissal of his case, Stipulation of Dismissal, supra
note 8, at 1. An earlier attempt to transfer Doe to Saudi Arabia was denied by the D.C. Circuit pending
the resolution of Doe’s habeas petition. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 748-49 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
16 One American is Warren Christopher Clark (nom de guerre: Abu Mohammad alAmeriki) of Houston, Texas. 5 Terrorists Have Been Captured Alive By Our Forces, SDF PRESS
(Jan. 6, 2019), http://sdf-press.com/en/2019/01/5-terrorists-have-been-captured-alive-by-ourforces/ [https://perma.cc/W7DG-HHTW]. Previous reporting indicated that Warren Clark applied
to ISIL to become an English teacher for the organization. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MELEAGROUHITCHENS, SEAMUS HUGHES & BENNETT CLIFFORD, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV.
PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM, THE TRAVELERS: AMERICAN JIHADISTS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ 57
(2018), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/TravelersAmTravelersAmericanJihadistsinS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/589R-EZ6N]. Reporting continues to indicate that among the 2,000 foreign
fighters currently detained in Syria, a small number are American. See Ryan Browne & Jennifer
Hansler, US Officials Say More Than 2,000 Suspected Foreign ISIS Fighters Being Held in Syria, CNN
(Apr. 17, 2019, 4:32 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/17/politics/foreign-isis-fighters-syria/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3YYN-3326]. Before August 1, the SDF transferred another Texan, Omer Kuzu, to
U.S. custody. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Texas Man Charged with Conspiring to Provide
Material Support to ISIS (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/texas-man-charged-conspiringprovide-material-support-isis [https://perma.cc/44UJ-KAKM].
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extradited Warren Christopher Clark and Omer Kuzu and charged them in
the civilian legal system.17 Meanwhile, other prisoners claiming to be
Americans, such as Lirim Sulejmani, remain in SDF prisons.18
The prosecutions of Clark and Kuzu demonstrate that when the U.S.
government has a clear case, it is willing to quickly act to bring a suspected
ISIL member into the civilian justice system. But when the situation is more
complicated, as is likely the case for the remaining American SDF prisoners,
the legal playing field outlined in this Article will shape U.S. decisionmaking.
Accordingly, the U.S. government will likely only take custody if the U.S. is
able to quickly bring charges in civilian courts in order to avoid the possibility
of litigating its authority to indefinitely detain the ISIL fighter under the
AUMF or Article II authority.
I. THE DETENTION OF JOHN DOE
At some point around September 11, 2017, the SDF detained John Doe, a
dual U.S.-Saudi national, near ISIL-controlled territory around Dayr az Zur,
Syria.19 Due to his U.S. citizenship, the SDF transferred him to the U.S.
military.20 The government alleged that Doe was a member of ISIL and
contended that he joined the organization in July 2014.21 The government
alleged that, after joining the organization, he “was an ISIL fighter recruit,
attended an ISIL training camp, swore loyalty to the ISIL leader, and worked
for and provided support to ISIL through his work in various capacities for
two-and-a-half years, until air strikes and other military offensives against
ISIL forced him to flee,” and he was captured by the SDF.22 The SDF found
Doe carrying $4,000 in cash, a GPS device, and a thumb drive containing
ISIL administrative spreadsheets as well as instructions for bomb making, the
use of various weapons, interrogation techniques, and other “how-to

17 See Indictment at 1-2, United States v. Clark, No. 19-0002 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2019); Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Texas Man Arrested for Attempting to Provide Material Support to a
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/texas-manarrested-attempting-provide-material-support-designated-foreign-terrorist [https://perma.cc/S2CPM9P6]. Kuzu was captured by the SDF in March 2019 and a criminal complaint was filed under seal
in the Northern District of Texas on June 5, 2019. Criminal Complaint ¶ 34, United States v. Kuzu,
No. 19-0327 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2019).
18 Robin Wright, The Dangerous Dregs of ISIS, NEW YORKER (Apr. 16, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-dangerous-dregs-of-isis [https://perma.cc/SW4TK6Z7]. Fewer than two dozen prisoners are American, and that number includes both fighters and
family members. Id.
19 Respondent’s Factual Return at 2, 32, Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195 (No. 17-2069).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 3.
22 Id.
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manuals.”23 The U.S. government also found his name listed as a “fighter” in
a separate ISIL document.24
Instead of charging Doe with crimes and bringing him back to civilian
custody as has been done with other terrorism suspects,25 the U.S. military
detained Doe without access to the courts or an attorney.26 The ACLU
asserted that his detention was in violation of the NDA, which stated that
“[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States
except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”27 The government contended that
Doe’s detention by the military was permitted under three independent
authorities: the 2001 AUMF targeting Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the 2002
AUMF targeting Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq, and the President’s
inherent powers under Article II of the Constitution.28
After the ACLU intervened and filed a habeas petition on Doe’s behalf,
Judge Tanya Chutkan of the D.C. District Court ordered the government to
give the ACLU access to Doe, and the ACLU received permission from Doe
to advance his case.29 The government then attempted, but was barred from,
transferring Doe to Saudi Arabia.30 With the merits of the habeas petition all
that remained before the district court, the government agreed to release Doe
in Bahrain.31 This allowed the government to avoid a court ruling on the
authority of the military to detain Doe and, because the NDA requires an act
of Congress to authorize the detention of an American citizen, to avoid a
court ruling on whether Congress has granted the executive the authority to
wage war against ISIL in Syria and detain American citizens who may take
up arms in that fight.32
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
See, e.g., Adam Goldman & Eric Schmitt, Benghazi Attacks Suspect is Captured in Libya by U.S.
Commandos, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/world/africa/benghaziattacks-second-suspect-captured.html [https://perma.cc/468U-RZXS] (describing several instances
where suspected terrorists were captured by the U.S. military and transferred back to the U.S. to face
criminal charges in civilian courts).
26 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2-3, Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195 (No. 17-2069)
[hereinafter Habeas Petition].
27 Id. at 7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2018)).
28 Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 5.
29 Doe v. Mattis—Challenge to Detention of American by U.S. Military Abroad, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/cases/doe-v-mattis-challenge-detention-american-us-military-abroad
[https://perma.cc/8F7E-BHWD] (last updated Oct. 29, 2018).
30 Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 201, aff ’d, 889 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
31 Stipulation of Dismissal, supra note 8, at 1.
32 The desire to dodge a ruling on the war against ISIL may also be the reason that the Trump
Administration has thus far balked at plans to send 600 ISIL fighters detained by the SDF to the prison at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. See Courtney Kube Trump Admin May Send Captured ISIS Fighters to Iraq Prison,
Guantanamo, NBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/trumpadmin-may-send-captured-isis-fighters-iraq-prison-guantanamo-n905066 [https://perma.cc/2WJ5-Y2RJ].
23
24
25
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II. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
In recent decades, the judiciary has generally avoided the question of
whether the President is authorized to use force in a given situation by citing
the political question doctrine. The political question doctrine prevents
judicial review because the doctrine “is primarily a function of the separation
of powers.”33 This has led to incorrect “sweeping statements to the effect that
all questions touching foreign relations are political questions.”34 Critics
argue that the expansive use of the doctrine is misguided and results from the
doctrine being “a tempting refuge from the adjudication of difficult
constitutional claims.”35 But in a case like Doe v. Mattis, the courts would have
been willing to engage on the merits because the historical tradition of the
courts and recent Supreme Court decisions involving foreign policy, habeas
petitions, and enemy combatants all drive towards that conclusion.36
The political question doctrine has been used by courts at all levels. Lower
courts have used it to avoid questions related to the U.S. invasion of
Grenada,37 the Vietnam War,38 and most recently the war against ISIL.39
These cases often note that the political question doctrine “excludes from

Moving those prisoners to long-term U.S. custody would allow the ISIL fighters to challenge their detention
through habeas petitions. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that the right of habeas
corpus applies to detainees at Guantanamo Bay); Tess Bridgeman, Joshua Geltzer & Luke Hartig,
Guantanamo is No Answer—But Here’s What Can Work, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/60540/guantanamo-answer-but-heres-work/ [https://perma.cc/EH5F-VH58]
(describing challenges the Trump Administration would face if it sent detainees to Guantanamo Bay).
However, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 permits the military prosecution of individuals who engage
in or support hostilities against U.S. coalition partners, a category that may include the SDF even outside of
an authorization to fight ISIL. Military Commissions Act of 2009 § 1802, 10 U.S.C. § 948c (2018). This could
allow the U.S. to bring charges against the detainees unrelated to whether or not military force was authorized
against ISIL—permitting the government to dodge the question. However, this question is not the focus of
this Comment, and such an argument may also fail.
33 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
34 Id. at 211.
35 Harold Koh, Judicial Constraints: The Courts and War Powers, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES, 121, 122-23 (Gary
Stern & Morton Halperin eds., 1994) (quoting Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500,
1514 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985)).
36 Standing is often grounds upon which the courts dismiss use of force challenges, as seen in
Campbell v. Clinton, where the D.C. Circuit ruled that a congressman did not have standing to
challenge President Clinton’s use of force in the Balkans. See generally 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
However, in Doe v. Mattis, it is clear that Doe faces a harm in being detained by the government and
will have standing similar to the petitioners in the military detention cases described infra notes 6474 and accompanying text.
37 Gary Stern & Morton Halperin, Introduction, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE
POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES, supra note 35, at 1, 8 n.7
(citing Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
38 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
39 Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 285 (D.D.C. 2016).
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judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and
value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of
Congress or the confines of the executive branch.”40
This deference to the executive branch becomes overly expansive in cases
involving military force, such as Smith v. Obama. In Smith, Judge Colleen
Kollar-Kotelly noted that “[q]uestions of statutory construction and
interpretation . . . are committed to the Judiciary,” but nonetheless avoided
conducting straightforward statutory interpretation.41 Judge Kollar-Kotelly
questioned the ability of the courts to “second-guess the executive’s application
of these statutes to specific facts on the ground in an ongoing combat mission
halfway around the world.”42 She noted that such a task would require the
courts to determine whether ISIL appropriately falls under the 2001 and 2002
AUMFs by examining the “nature and extent” of ISIL’s relationship to Al
Qaeda and whether targeting ISIL is appropriate to defend the U.S. against
the continuing threat posed by Iraq.43 As a result, she concluded that this
raised questions of fact that the courts are not equipped to handle.44
The Smith decision relies too strongly on the political question doctrine.45
The doctrine focuses on questions of separation of powers and “indeterminate
legal standards.”46 In examining whether ISIL is a part of Al Qaeda for
purposes of the AUMF, the courts can use all of their normal factfinding
tools, such as “interrogatories, depositions, testimony, and all the other means
of gathering evidence.”47 There is no basis to argue that the Constitution
requires courts to refrain from decisions regarding questions of law related to
the use of military force48—in fact, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”49 It is striking to see Judge
Kollar-Kotelly conclude that the courts have no role in determining whether
ISIL is a part of Al Qaeda when the D.C. Circuit has stated that “[w]hether
the alleged connections between [a] force and Al Qaeda . . . are sufficient to
render it an ‘associated force’ [is a] legal question[] that we review de novo.”50
40 Id. at 297 (quoting El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 840 (D.C.
Cir. 2010)).
41 Id. at 299.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 299-300.
44 Id. at 300.
45 See Michael Glennon, Smith v. Obama: The Political Question Doctrine Misapplied, JUST
SECURITY (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/34803/smith-v-obama-political-questiondoctrine-misapplied/ [https://perma.cc/8GQ3-RQ63].
46 Id. (emphasis removed).
47 Id.
48 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 147 (1996).
49 Glennon, supra note 45 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
50 Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return at 21 n.9, Doe v. Mattis, 288 F. Supp.
3d 195 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-2069) (quoting Khan v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
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A. Historical Willingness to Adjudicate Questions Surrounding the Use of Force
From the earliest days of the Republic, the judiciary has felt comfortable
addressing whether the executive branch is authorized to use military force.
Legal issues that involved foreign policy were “generally addressed in
accordance with a traditional, formal structure of constitutionally delegated
and reserved powers.”51 While political issues could create “complex or
challenging cases,” the courts did “not refuse to assume jurisdiction even
though questions of extreme political importance [were] also . . . involved.”52
At the start of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court decided cases
relating to whether or not Congress had declared war against France during
the Quasi-War of 1798–1800 and the extent of the President’s authority under
an authorization to direct the use of military force.53 The Quasi-War was
sparked by French harassment of U.S. ships at sea and a demand for a bribe
by French officials in what became known as the XYZ Affair.54 In Bas v. Tingy,
the Supreme Court found that declarations of Congress had authorized
limited hostilities against France even without a declaration of war.55 One of
the Justices noted that Congress passed legislation in 1799 where it
[r]aised an army; stopped all intercourse with France; dissolved our treaty; built
and equipped ships of war; and commissioned private armed ships: enjoining
the former and authorizing the latter, to defend themselves against armed ships
of France, to attack them on the high seas, to subdue and take them as prize.56

The Court comfortably determined that Congress had authorized the
conflict.57 A year later the Court reaffirmed this willingness to answer the
question of whether war was authorized in Talbot v. Seeman, and Chief Justice
John Marshall wrote that “the acts of [Congress] can alone be resorted to as
our guides in this inquiry,” directing the Court to evaluate whether Congress
had authorized general or partial hostilities.58
The Court went even further a few years later in a dispute over the seizure of
a ship in Little v. Barreme and concluded that the executive had exceeded the
51 Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1897, 1911 (2015) (internal quotations omitted).
52 Id. at 1912.
53 See Louis Fisher, Historical Survey of the War Powers and the Use of Force, in THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 35, at 11, 14-15.
54 JOHN FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE 342, 352-54 (1996).
55 HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 81 (1990).
56 RANDALL WALTON BLAND, THE BLACK ROBE AND THE BALD EAGLE: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1961, at 18 (1999) (quoting Bas
v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800)).
57 Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 46.
58 BLAND, supra note 56, at 18 (quoting Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801)).
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authority given to it by Congress to conduct the Quasi-War.59 In Little, the Court
examined whether a Navy commander violated the law in seizing a ship sailing
from a French port when the laws authorizing the hostilities only permitted the
seizure of ships sailing to French ports.60 The Court ruled that it did not matter
that the commander was acting on a presidential order, because the President
could not act as Commander in Chief without “any special authority.”61
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court used traditional tools of
constitutional and statutory interpretation in order to determine whether
Congress had authorized a conflict and to what extent Congress had authorized
the Commander in Chief to execute that conflict. The Court did not shy away
from the fact that its decision would have political consequences, because there
were clear roles delineated by the Constitution for Congress and the President.
As many critics of the expansive use of the political question doctrine have
argued, there are adequate standards available for the courts to determine
whether war has been authorized.62 Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage
quoted Professor Wormuth’s Vietnam-era scholarship describing the
distinction as analogous to the distinctions found in Marbury v. Madison:
There are no standards for going to war, and therefore the war power was
given to Congress. No suitor may complain because Congress has declared
war; and the courts may not take an action because Congress has declared
war . . . . But the standards to determine whether Congress has exercised its
war power are simple and easy to apply. Similarly, in Marbury v. Madison,
Chief Justice Marshall said that deciding whom to appoint was a political
question, but whether an appointment had been made was a justiciable
question. The legality of [war] is a justiciable question.63

In a case such as Doe, the question was not whether the war against ISIL
was justified or wise, but rather whether Congress had exercised its war power.
With the tools available to navigate questions surrounding the legality of war
in the constitutional system, the courts have a role to play in this debate.
B. Modern Assertion of the Traditional Role of the Courts
Following a detour from this approach for much of the twentieth century
due to overly broad interpretations of the political question doctrine, the
Id. at 20.
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 170 (1804).
BLAND, supra note 56, at 20 (quoting Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177); accord KOH, supra
note 55, at 82.
62 FRANCIS WORMUTH & EDWIN FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR
POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 246 (1989).
63 Id. (quoting Francis Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 CALIF. L.
REV. 623, 680-81 (1972)).
59
60
61
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Supreme Court appears to have once again gained the willingness to apply
traditional constitutional and statutory interpretation doctrines to questions
of war powers. This has been especially stark since the beginning of the War
on Terror as the Court repeatedly limited the President’s wartime powers in
military detention cases.64 One of the earliest cases in this trend, and the most
consequential for cases like Doe, was Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.65
Yaser Esam Hamdi is an American citizen who joined the Taliban and was
captured while carrying a Kalashnikov rifle on the battlefield in Afghanistan
by the U.S.-aligned Northern Alliance.66 Once the Northern Alliance learned
of Hamdi’s citizenship, they turned him over to the United States (just as the
SDF did with Doe, Clark, and Kuzu), where he was held in military
detention.67 Hamdi filed a habeas petition challenging the authority of the
military to hold him and the government argued that because this related to
military actions, the courts should not be able to second guess the President
and instead should defer to the political branches.68 The court of appeals
initially sided with the government, by denying the request for any hearing
on the issue.69 The Supreme Court rejected this deference to the
government’s determination and instead ruled that Hamdi was entitled to
notice and a hearing.70
The Court pushed even further in ensuing cases, rejecting government
claims to deference even in cases involving foreign nationals detained by the
military. Rasul v. Bush gave military detainees in Guantanamo Bay the right
to judicial review of their detention,71 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld struck down the
President’s military commission system,72 and Boumediene v. Bush struck
down a statute that attempted to deny habeas rights to foreign fighters
detained in Guantanamo Bay.73 In each of these cases, the Supreme Court
continued to reject the idea that the political question doctrine reserved
complicated questions of war to the political branches. Even when Congress
and the President act together in the context of war and military conflict,
Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1921-24.
542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
AMANDA DIPAOLO, ZONES OF TWILIGHT: WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND
FEDERAL COURT DECISION MAKING 70 (2009).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 70-71.
69 Id. at 71.
70 Id. at 71-72; see Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1922 (describing the Hamdi decision).
71 542 U.S. 466, 472-73 (2004).
72 548 U.S. 557, 567-68 (2006) (plurality opinion). President Bush established the military
commission system without the involvement of Congress in order to create a process for prosecuting
enemy combatants detained under the 2001 AUMF. Id.
73 553 U.S. 723, 732-33 (2008); see also Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1922-23 (describing
the “unexpected and remarkable” series of losses the government experienced in these post-9/11
Supreme Court cases).
64
65
66
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Boumediene stands for the proposition that they cannot go beyond the limits
of the Constitution because “[t]he laws and Constitution are designed to
survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times.”74
These military detention cases and the cases from the early 1800s are
particularly notable because they came at times of heightened concern about
the security of the country. The Quasi-War cases show that “even during
America’s infancy, the time of its greatest national insecurity, foreign affairs
were not treated as exempt from the ordinary constitutional system of checks
and balances.”75 The military detention cases, meanwhile, demonstrate that
“[i]n the context of wartime exigency, in which exceptionalist arguments
should be at their strongest and in which the executive branch relied upon
those arguments,” the Supreme Court continued to evaluate the merits of the
cases and find them justiciable.76 Doe v. Mattis certainly involved wartime
exigency and concern about national security, but it stands out no more than
Hamdi, which occurred in the wake of the worst terror attack on U.S. soil, or
the Quasi-War cases, which occurred in the earliest days of the Republic,
when the nation’s future was still uncertain.
The current Supreme Court recently broke with the political question
doctrine “in broad and sweeping terms” in Zivotofsky v. Clinton.77 In Zivotofsky,
the government argued, and lower courts held, that the political question
doctrine prevented the courts from adjudicating the case.78 The Supreme
Court rejected those arguments and abandoned the guidance of Baker v. Carr,
instead emphasizing “the power—and obligation—of the courts to resolve
foreign relations cases, even ones that involve difficult separation of powers
questions.”79 Chief Justice John Roberts wrote:
The federal courts are not being asked to supplant a foreign policy decision
of the political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination of
what United States policy . . . should be. Instead [the petitioner] requests
that the courts enforce a specific statutory right. To resolve his claim, the
Judiciary must decide if [his] interpretation of the statute is correct . . . . This
is a familiar judicial exercise.80

As a result, based on the history of the Court’s willingness to answer these
types of questions and the current Court’s demonstrated willingness and
ability to conduct a “familiar judicial exercise” in evaluating congressional
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
KOH, supra note 55, at 83.
Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1924.
Id. at 1925.
Id.
Id. at 1925-26.
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012).
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authorizations and executive actions, Doe v. Mattis would have been heard on
the merits so that the court could interpret the AUMFs and determine
whether the executive had the authority to indefinitely detain Doe.81 Should
the U.S. government take custody of any of the remaining American SDF
prisoners without bringing criminal charges, this same analysis will lead
courts directly to the merits of their inevitable habeas challenges.
III. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION
One avenue for justifying the military detention of an American citizen
accused of joining ISIL is congressional authorization. The Non-Detention
Act of 1971 states that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained
by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”82 No law has
been passed to explicitly authorize the military detention of American
citizens fighting on behalf of ISIL,83 but an authorization to use military force
carries an implied authorization to detain enemy combatants pursuant to the
laws of war.84 The outstanding question, then, is whether Congress has
authorized the use of military force against ISIL.
A. The Arguments for and against Doe’s Detention Under the
2001 AUMF and the 2012 NDAA
Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress authorized the executive to use
force against those responsible. The 2001 AUMF against Al Qaeda and the
Taliban states:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
81 “[U]nder the Constitution, one of the judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes,
and we cannot shirk from this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant
political overtones.” Koh, supra note 35, at 123 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y,
478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)).
82 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2018).
83 The Military Commissions Act notably applies only to non-citizens. Military Commissions
Act of 2009 § 1802, 10 U.S.C. § 948c (2018). The military detention language of the 2012 National
Defense Authorization Act noted that its provisions shall not “be construed to affect existing law or
authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens.” National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012 (2012 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021(e), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). Since
Congress has not changed its position on the military detention of U.S. citizens as reflected in the
Non-Detention Act of 1971, the Non-Detention Act is still binding. The history of the act will be
further discussed infra Part IV.
84 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (plurality opinion) (finding the 2001
AUMF provided authorization for the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants when fighting
on behalf of Al Qaeda or the Taliban). A more restrictive view was articulated by Justice Scalia and
asserted that the AUMF did not authorize the military detention of U.S. citizens, but it only gained
the support of one other Justice. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens, J.).
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authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States
by such nations, organizations or persons.85

This statement was scaled back from an initial request by President
George W. Bush for an authorization to “deter and pre-empt any future acts
of terrorism or aggression against the United States without regard to the
entities involved.”86 In instituting this restriction, Congress refused to
authorize the use of force against those unconnected to 9/11, even if it meant
that the President may be restricted in preventing other terrorist attacks.87
As a result, the focus of the 2001 AUMF is on Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
In Hamdi, the Court ruled that this authorization contained an implied
authorization from Congress to detain U.S. citizens if they were captured as
enemy combatants fighting on behalf of Al Qaeda or the Taliban.88 This is
because “[t]he capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture,
detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by universal agreement and
practice, are important incident[s] of war.”89 Accordingly, “detention to
prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of
waging war, [so] in permitting the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’
Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention . . . .”90 In other
words, because Congress had authorized the use of force against the Taliban,
Hamdi could be held for the duration of hostilities.91
1. Associated Forces
To justify the military detention of Doe or any other American citizen,
the government would need to show that ISIL is covered by the 2001 AUMF,
which was directed at those who “authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”92 While ISIL did not
exist on September 11, 2001, the government contends that ISIL is covered as
either a part of Al Qaeda or as an associated force of Al Qaeda.93 Whether or
not the 2001 AUMF includes implied coverage of associated forces of Al
85 Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224, 224 (2001).
86 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2079 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).
87 Id.
88 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517 (plurality opinion).
89 Id. at 518 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
90 Id. at 519.
91 Id. at 521.
92 2001 AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
93 Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 14.
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Qaeda and the Taliban is a disputed point;94 however, it is an argument that
the D.C. Circuit has picked up,95 and the government routinely refers to the
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith article on this topic.96 Yet even when
taking the approach of the government, the argument still ultimately fails
because ISIL does not meet the government’s definition of an associated force.
An associated force fills an analogous role to co-belligerents in a
traditional war.97
Terrorist organizations that act as agents of al Qaeda, participate with al
Qaeda in acts of war against the United States, systematically provide
military resources to al Qaeda, or serve as fundamental communication links
in the war against the United States, and perhaps those that systematically
permit their buildings and safehouses to be used by al Qaeda in the war
against the United States . . . .98

can be considered associated forces and covered by the authorities included
in the 2001 AUMF.99 This interpretation was reaffirmed by the 2012 National
Defense Authorization Act, where Congress affirmed that the President could
use “all necessary and appropriate force” against those who conducted the 9/11
attacks and those who are “a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners.”100
The government has defined an associated force of Al Qaeda or the
Taliban to be (1) “an organized, armed group that has entered the fight
alongside al-Qa’ida or the Taliban,” and (2) “the group must be a cobelligerent with al-Qa’ida or the Taliban in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners.”101 A 2016 White House report on current use-

94 Compare, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2109-10 (arguing that today, Al Qaeda
operates through a “confederacy of affiliated terrorist organizations around the world that it inspires,
leads, and supports”), with Rebecca Ingber, Co-Belligerency, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 67, 73 (2017) (“This
theory . . . rests on flawed doctrinal grounds, both in its application of largely obsolete neutrality
law principles designed for states to a modern conflict with a non-state terrorist group, and in its
overstating of the consequences of a neutrality breach under that historic body of law.”).
95 See Khan v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“We have held that the AUMF grants
the President authority (inter alia) to detain individuals who are ‘part of forces associated with Al
Qaeda or the Taliban.’” (quoting Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010))).
96 E.g., Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 14 (citing Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 86).
97 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2113.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 2012 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021 (a)–(b), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
101 WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE
UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 4
(2016) [hereinafter 2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT]; Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 15.
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of-force authorities noted that “a group is not an associated force simply
because it aligns with al-Qa’ida or the Taliban or embraces their ideology.”102
The government concluded that ISIL is an associated force of Al Qaeda
because of ISIL’s history. The government traced the formation of ISIL back to
Abu Mu’sab al-Zarqawi’s decision to merge his group with Al Qaeda and form Al
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).103 AQI engaged in attacks against U.S. and coalition forces
through the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011.104 In 2006, AQI changed its name
to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and began claiming attacks under that name.105
When Osama Bin Laden was killed by U.S. forces in 2011, ISI pledged allegiance
to his successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri.106 In 2013, ISI expanded operations into
Syria and changed its name to the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, which the
State Department recognized as ISIL in 2014.107 Accordingly, the government
argues that “ISIL basically is al-Qaeda in Iraq.”108
2. Appropriate Deference in Foreign Policy: Curtiss-Wright to Chevron
Courts evaluating a case involving ISIL detainees therefore must determine
what deference to give the government’s interpretation of the 2001 AUMF. The
courts could question whether the AUMF covers associated forces, whether the
government’s definition of associated forces is appropriate, or whether the
government has properly applied its definition to the facts. Alternatively, the
courts could defer entirely to the government’s interpretation.
Many have argued that great deference should be granted to the executive for
any delegation related to foreign policy.109 Taken to the extreme, this would mean
that since Congress delegated the authority to use force against those who
“planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001,”110 the executive should be free to determine who is an
associated force of Al Qaeda and use military force accordingly.

2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 5-6.
Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 9.
Id.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10 (quoting Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs on Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence in
Iraq: A Threat to U.S. Interests, 113th Cong. 6 (2014) (testimony of Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Iraq and Iran, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State)).
109 See Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1492, 1546-48 (2004) (summarizing the debate around nondelegation in foreign policy, including
Justice Rehnquist’s belief that “nondelegation simply does not apply in the field of foreign affairs”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
110 2001 AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
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This more expansive interpretation stems from United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.111 In Curtiss-Wright, the Court held that the normal limitations on
restrictions against overly broad delegations from Congress to the executive did
not apply in foreign policy.112 Justice George Sutherland based this decision on
three parts. First, he argued that sovereignty over foreign affairs was passed
from the British Crown to the colonial government after the Declaration of
Independence and accordingly existed outside of the Constitution and could not
be limited by Article I.113 However, this argument has been rejected by the
Supreme Court, and conflicts with even a cursory reading of our nation’s history,
because “[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power
and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the
limitations imposed by the Constitution.”114
Second, Justice Sutherland reasoned that expansive delegations in
foreign affairs were permitted because “the President is the sole organ of
the government in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations.”115 While this was dicta, the assertion has carried significant
weight over the years and is still cited by the executive branch.116 Yet this
ignores the fact that the Founding Fathers divided the powers over foreign
policy, especially those pertaining to war, between the branches of
government—the same type of division that gives rise to the nondelegation
doctrine in the first place.117
The third element of Justice Sutherland’s opinion was that there was a
longstanding practice of Congress delegating authority to the President in
cases of international commerce so that the President could determine
whether or not to enforce a statute.118 This was a question of trade and
communication with foreign nations and the ability of Congress to delegate
decisionmaking, not a question of the President’s “unrestricted judgment”
with regards to war.119
Given the constitutional and relevancy concerns with using Curtiss-Wright
as precedent, the court must then determine what standards should be used.
As described in Part IV, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer provides an
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Id. at 320-22.
WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 62, at 211 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316).
WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 62, at 212 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1957)); accord Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2116 (2015)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The People of the United States had other ideas when they organized our
government.”).
115 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 62, at 212 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319).
116 Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2089-90.
117 Id. at 2087-88.
118 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 62, at 213-14 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 329).
119 Id. at 214.
111
112
113
114
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appropriate analytical framework for evaluating presidential power in the
context of congressional action or inaction,120 but the courts must first
determine what Congress said in the 2001 AUMF. Throughout the twentieth
century, the Court repeatedly turned to Schechter Poultry121 and the traditional
nondelegation cases—and not Curtiss-Wright—when evaluating foreign policy
cases.122 This implies that the courts should not defer entirely to the
executive’s interpretation of the AUMF and instead the courts should
interpret the statute more narrowly to avoid any nondelegation doctrine
problems.123
Moving away from Curtiss-Wright leaves open the question of what deference
should be applied in foreign policy. There is significant scholarship discussing
the appropriate level of deference that the courts should grant to the executive.
Some argue that there should be no deference and courts should “scrutinize
executive action closely” when the executive is interpreting law that is made
partly outside the executive and that limits the exercise of executive power.124
Others have argued for Chevron-level125 deference even when Congress has not
delegated authority to the executive branch, reasoning that the executive branch
is more politically accountable for foreign policy decisions.126 This Comment
will focus on a style that is more restrictive than Curtiss-Wright, but still
deferential to the executive branch when the law is unclear. Accordingly, the
focus will be on Chevron and Skidmore deference and, in doing so, this Comment
will align with the sentiment of Part II above, which demonstrated that the
courts already have the tools to handle these types of cases.127
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. established a
two-step process to evaluating executive branch actions: “the Court first asks
whether the statute speaks to the precise issue clearly, and if not, the Court
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
The nondelegation doctrine restricts the delegation from Congress to the President of
powers explicitly reserved to the legislative branch by the Constitution. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-52 (1935).
122 WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 62, at 215-18.
123 See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (“A
construction of the statute that avoids this kind of open-ended grant [of legislative power] should
certainly be favored.”).
124 Derek Jinks & Neal K. Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1234,
1239 (2007).
125 See infra notes 127–129 and accompanying text.
126 Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort
Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 613-15 (2013) (noting that Congress did not delegate authority to the
President in the Alien Tort Statute but that some writers have made a “facially appealing argument”
that Chevron-level deference should apply anyway).
127 See, e.g., Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1959 (“Normalizing deference . . . involves
adopting administrative law’s deference doctrines . . . . Under Mead, when an agency has been
delegated authority and exercises that authority to interpret the statute, and that interpretation has
the force of law, then the interpretation is eligible for Chevron deference.” (footnotes omitted)).
120
121
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then defers to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.”128 Where
a ruling falls outside of Chevron, it can be given Skidmore deference129 due to
the “specialized experience and broader investigations and information
available to the agency.”130 While the 2001 AUMF does not include a formal
delegation of rulemaking or adjudicatory powers, it can be seen to have an
“indication of a comparable congressional intent.”131
3. Deferring on the Question of Law, but Lacking Facts to
Establish that ISIL Is an Associated Force
The 2001 AUMF does not explicitly define associated forces, or even
include a mention of the term (although the 2012 NDAA does), but assuming
that the AUMF has given the executive rulemaking or adjudicatory powers
would allow the courts to defer to the executive’s definition of the term. Given
the Court’s willingness to read the 2001 AUMF to include an authority to
detain American citizens because it is a necessary part of war,132 the Court
will likely find a similar justification to allow the U.S. to use force against
those entities that join forces with Al Qaeda against the United States.133
Such a need to combat all those who may fight alongside Al Qaeda in order
to defeat Al Qaeda appears to be the type of thing considered a necessary
part of war. Accordingly, the government’s definition of an associated force
provides guidance for the courts.134
The courts must therefore assess the government’s facts to see if there is “a
rational connection between the evidence and their ultimate conclusion.”135 The
government must show facts to establish that ISIL is (1) an “organized, armed
group that has entered the fight alongside al-Qa’ida” and (2) “a co-belligerent
with al-Qa’ida . . . in hostilities against the United States or its coalition

Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
When Congress has not delegated authority, Skidmore v. Swift & Co. stands for the proposition
that the interpretations of the executive branch can provide “a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
130 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (internal quotations omitted); accord
Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1959.
131 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1965 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law
Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2665-67 (2005)).
132 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion).
133 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2110 (“[A] terrorist organization that joins al
Qaeda in its conflict with the United States, even after September 11, can be viewed as part of the
‘organization’ against which Congress authorized force.”).
134 2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 4-5.
135 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1967 (noting that the courts routinely conduct this
type of analysis when the government asserts that an entity supports terrorism).
128
129
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partners.”136 The government has laid out a number of strong facts tying ISIL
to Al Qaeda,137 but it has not adequately addressed all of the relevant facts.138
The government fails to fully address the split between ISIL and Al
Qaeda that occurred in 2014. At the same time that ISIL was expanding into
Syria, Al Qaeda created Jabhat al-Nusra (or the al-Nusra Front) as a separate
group.139 In 2013, ISIL and Al Qaeda leadership began a dispute over who was
the official Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria, with ISIL ultimately rejecting Al
Qaeda leadership’s orders to recognize Jabhat al-Nusra.140 This led to Al
Qaeda disavowing ISIL and ending their affiliation.141 As the State
Department testified at the time, “Zawahiri has publicly distanced the AQ
leadership from ISIL’s unpopular actions against Syria’s Sunni population,
and it now appears that ISIL is conducting operations in Syria and Iraq
entirely independent of any counsel or assistance from AQ core
leadership.”142
This dispute was not simply a war of words. ISIL and Al Qaeda went to war
with one another. ISIL was quick to assassinate a senior Al Qaeda operative in
Syria,143 and hundreds of fighters were killed in fighting between Jabhat alNusra and ISIL.144 As the fighting between the two groups continued, the leader
of al-Nusra declared “There is no solution between us and them in the
meantime, or in the foreseeable future . . . . We hope they repent to God and
return to their senses . . . if not, then there is nothing but fighting between us.”145

2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 4.
See supra notes 100–107 and accompanying text.
“Co-belligerent” does not have a clear definition in international law though it has
historically been analogous to “ally.” See Ingber, supra note 94, at 80 (“It is a label for entities,
historically states—and in particular belligerent states—that have joined an armed conflict on the side
of one of the parties. It is similar in meaning to ‘ally,’ though it lacks any requirement for the formal
ties that label suggests.” (footnotes omitted)).
139 Daniel L. Byman & Jennifer R. Williams, ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-globalcivil-war/ [https://perma.cc/W9T9-RREP].
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 11 n.23 (citing Hearing, supra note 108
(testimony of Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and Iran, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Department of State)).
143 Senior Al-Qaeda Figure Killed by ISIS, DAILY STAR (Feb. 24, 2014, 12:21 AM),
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Feb-24/248278-senior-al-qaeda-figure-killedby-isis.ashx#axzz2u6nIcwPB [https://perma.cc/3SHE-FBE4].
144 See, e.g., Hundreds Killed as ISIL Insurgents Gain Ground in East Syria, REUTERS (June 10, 2014,
7:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-rebels/hundreds-killed-as-isil-insurgentsgain-ground-in-east-syria-idUSKBN0EL10R20140610?irpc=932 [https://perma.cc/Q9LA-PL7G].
145 Nusra Leader: No End to Conflict with ISIL in Syria, AL JAZEERA (June 4, 2015),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/nusra-leader-conflict-isil-syria-150604021024858.html
[https://perma.cc/NAK6-WYLV].
136
137
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Internationally, the decision about whether to align with ISIL or Al Qaeda has
led to fighting, assassinations, and splits between groups.146
The direct fighting and rivalry for influence both in Syria and in the
broader jihadist movement makes it impossible to conclude that there is a
rational connection between the evidence available and the government’s
conclusion that ISIL is an associated force of Al Qaeda. While ISIL at one
time did enter the fight alongside Al Qaeda, it cannot be said to be a cobelligerent of Al Qaeda at least since the start of 2014.147 Returning to the
Bradley and Goldsmith definition of co-belligerency in the War on Terror,
ISIL since 2014: has not participated with Al Qaeda in acts of war against the
U.S.; has not systematically provided resources to al Qaeda, or served as a
fundamental communications link for Al Qaeda; and has not systematically
permitted Al Qaeda to use its buildings, safehouses, or territories.148 The
timing of Doe’s capture mattered because courts that have evaluated the
associated-force question in the context of detention proceedings have
focused on whether or not the entity in question was an associated force of
Al Qaeda or the Taliban at the time an individual was detained.149 Therefore
in 2017, when Doe was brought into U.S. custody, ISIL could not be
considered “a co-belligerent with al-Qa’ida . . . in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners.”150
The government has two primary counterarguments. The first is that by
failing to treat ISIL as an associated force the courts “would allow an enemy
force—rather than the President and Congress—to control the scope of the
2001 AUMF by splintering into rival factions while continuing to prosecute
the same conflict against the United States.”151 On its face, this is a valid
concern. We would not want nonstate actors to be able to manipulate an
authorization to use military force simply by changing their name. But this is
not simply a name change or a split designed to evade U.S. military action.
146 Goktug Sonmez, Violent Extremism Among Central Asians: The Istanbul, St. Petersburg, Stockholm,
and New York City Attacks, 10 CTC SENTINEL, Dec. 2017, at 14, 16 (describing fighting between the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Taliban after the IMU switched loyalty to ISIL and a subsequent
split in IMU as some fighters sought to realign with the Taliban and Al Qaeda).
147 See CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA’S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY 688
(2015) (“[T]he President’s gambit [to define ISIL as an associated force of Al Qaeda] is, at bottom,
presidential unilateralism masquerading as implausible statutory interpretation.” (quoting
Goldsmith, supra note 5)).
148 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 86, at 2113.
149 Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 50, at 24 (citing Khan v.
Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
150 2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 4. The courts should not defer to
unsupported assertions by the executive branch. In recent years the Supreme Court has refused to
do so—even rejecting the executive branch’s factual assessments of military necessity in Boumediene
v. Bush. Robert Knowles, Warfare as Regulation, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1953, 1990 (2017).
151 2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 6.
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There is reason to believe that Jabhat al-Nusra’s recent separation from Al
Qaeda is such a split designed to evade targeting, but it would be easy for the
government to provide unclassified evidence demonstrating the façade.152
The Jabhat al-Nusra “split” with Al Qaeda involved no violence, no public
rivalry for members or power, and was apparently done on good terms. The
ISIL–Al Qaeda split was the opposite and involved assassinations and intense
fighting over territory in Syria.153 Based on these examples in Syria alone, the
U.S. government would be able to provide the courts with sufficient facts to
demonstrate whether a name change or a split between jihadist groups
covered under an AUMF is something that has been put on for show or a real
falling out between entities as they lose co-belligerent status. This is exactly
the type of factfinding that Article III courts are authorized to do.
The second counterargument is that ISIL has continued to carry out attacks
in Syria and terrorist operations around the world.154 The government notes
that ISIL was heavily involved in fighting in Syria while kidnapping civilians,
aid workers, and reporters, and has been responsible for large-scale attacks in
the West and inspiring others to commit attacks in their name.155 ISIL even
claims to be “the true executor of bin Laden’s legacy.”156 Yet this argument
ignores the fact that the case against counting ISIL as an associated force of Al
Qaeda is not that ISIL is a force for good. ISIL is a terrorist organization that
must be countered. However, as noted earlier, the White House has stated that
“a group is not an associated force simply because it aligns with al-Qa’ida or the
Taliban or embraces their ideology. Merely engaging in acts of terrorism or
merely sympathizing with al-Qa’ida . . . is not enough to bring a group within
the scope of the 2001 AUMF.”157 ISIL’s claim to the legacy of bin Laden and its
continued attacks are reason for concern and would serve as prime justification
for congressional action but are not justification for inclusion as an associated
force under the 2001 AUMF.

152 Yasir Abbas, How Al Qaeda is Winning in Syria, WAR ON THE ROCKS (May 10, 2016),
https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/how-al-qaeda-is-winning-in-syria/ [https://perma.cc/6LZN-6PA4]
(examining how Jabhat al-Nusra has cautiously grown its power and influence in Syria, having learned
from the backlash that Al Qaeda inspired by acting too harshly in Iraq). See generally CHARLES LISTER,
THE BROOKINGS PROJECT ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD, PROFILING JABHAT
AL-NUSRA
(2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Brookings-AnalysisPaper_Charles-Lister_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L2E-RSJR] (detailing the history of Jabhat al-Nusra
and some of the considerations that likely went into the decision to officially split with Al Qaeda).
153 See supra notes 138–145 and accompanying text.
154 Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 11.
155 Id.
156 2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 6.
157 Id. at 4-5.
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Since ISIL should not be considered an associated force, the government
would not be able to use the 2001 AUMF as a justification for holding Doe.158
B. The Arguments for and Against Doe’s Detention Under the 2002 Iraq AUMF
The U.S. government also points to Congress’s authorization for the war
against Saddam Hussein’s government as justification for the war against
ISIL. The 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq
authorized the President to use the military as “he determines to be necessary
and appropriate in order to . . . defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and to “enforce all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”159 While
disputed, this likely also included an implied authorization to use force
against any immediate threats arising in the aftermath of the invasion of
Iraq.160 However, the government stretches this authority too far.161
First, the authority of the 2002 AUMF likely expired early in the morning
on December 18, 2011. That is when “[t]he last convoy of U.S. soldiers pulled
out of Iraq . . . ending nearly nine years of war.”162 In the lead up to the final
withdrawal in December, the President declared the end of the war in Iraq163
and turned over all detainees in U.S. military custody to the Iraqi

158 Legislation proposed by Senators Bob Corker and Tim Kaine would have provided
authorization for the war against ISIL and therefore the detention of Doe; however, it died in
Congress. Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2018, S.J. Res. 59, 115th Cong. (2018).
159 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF),
Pub. L. No. 107-243, § 3(a), 116 Stat. 1498, 1501 (2002).
160 Robert Chesney argues that

the 2002 AUMF would be best read as implicitly conferring the authority to keep troops
in the field there in an effort to clean up our own mess, as it were (or at least to try to
do so), as an organic extension of the authority to cause that mess in the first place.
Robert Chesney, A Response to Bruce Ackerman: Whether the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs Are Exhausted,
LAWFARE BLOG (Sept. 8, 2011, 11:05 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/response-bruce-ackermanwhether-2001-and-2002-aumfs-are-exhausted [https://perma.cc/W3CX-9ZBD].
161 See WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE
UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 3
(2018), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4411804/3-18-War-Powers-Transparency-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SW5H-CHT8] [hereinafter 2018 WHITE HOUSE REPORT] (concluding that the 2002
AUMF provides justification for the war against ISIL).
162 Joseph Logan, Last U.S. Troops Leave Iraq, Ending War, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2011, 11:40 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-withdrawal/last-u-s-troops-leave-iraq-ending-waridUSTRE7BH03320111218 [https://perma.cc/8JLT-Y4FS].
163 Matt Compton, President Obama Has Ended the War in Iraq, THE WHITE HOUSE: BLOG
(Oct. 21, 2011, 2:18 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/10/21/president-obamahas-ended-war-iraq [https://perma.cc/CDX5-BSDK].
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government.164 There was no longer a threat posed by Iraq, and any inherent
authority to deal with postinvasion disorder ended when U.S. forces
withdrew from the country. The last U.N. Security Council Resolution
expired in 2008.165 Even as the U.S. began the fight against ISIL in the
summer of 2014, the National Security Advisor wrote that the “Iraq AUMF
is no longer used for any U.S. government activities” and in the fall of 2014,
the President stated, “[w]ith respect to Iraq, there was a very specific AUMF.
We now have a different enemy.”166 No justification remained to employ the
2002 AUMF in Iraq.
To the degree that the 2002 AUMF remains in force, the government’s
arguments in the Doe v. Mattis litigation and its 2018 Report on the Legal and
Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force and Related
National Security Operations fail to show that the 2002 AUMF applies to
ISIL.167 The government argues that the 2002 AUMF authorizes the use of
force against ISIL to the extent it is “necessary to counter the threat that ISIL
poses to a stable, democratic Iraq.”168 Yet the text of the 2002 AUMF is clear
and this analysis would not proceed beyond the first step of Chevron
deference. The 2002 AUMF authorizes the use of force to deal with the threat
posed by Iraq, not to Iraq.169 ISIL posed a threat to Iraq, especially at the
height of its power in 2014, but this threat is not being posed by Iraq.
Alternatively, there have been limited arguments that because former
members of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist government joined ISIL as it gained
momentum in Iraq, their membership in ISIL provides a sufficient link to the
2002 AUMF.170 However, members of one organization who have ties to an
AUMF-targeted group do not automatically make their new group fall under
the AUMF. Despite the Al Qaeda ties of prominent leaders of Al Shabaab in
164 Charlie Savage, U.S. Transfers Its Last Prisoner in Iraq to Iraqi Custody, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/world/middleeast/us-transfers-last-prisoner-to-iraqi-government.html
[https://perma.cc/EMX2-96B2].
165 S.C. Res. 1790, ¶ 1 (Dec. 18, 2007); Chesney, supra note 159.
166 William S. Castle, The Argument for a New and Flexible Authorization for the Use of Military
Force, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 525-26 (2015) (quoting Letter from Susan Rice, Nat’l Sec.
Adviser, to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (July 25, 2014); The
President Holds a Press Conference After the Midterm Elections, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 5, 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/11/05/president-holds-pressconference-after-midterm-elections [https://perma.cc/ZL6F-X2YN]).
167 For the government’s arguments, see Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 20-22;
2018 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 160, at 3.
168 Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 21; see also 2018 White House Report, supra
note 160, at 3 (“[T]he 2002 AUMF . . . has always been understood to authorize the use of force for
the related dual purposes of helping to establish a stable, democratic Iraq and for the purpose of
addressing terrorist threats emanating from Iraq.”).
169 2002 AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-243, § 3(a)(1), 116 Stat. 1498, 1501.
170 MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43760, A NEW AUTHORIZATION FOR USE
OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE: ISSUES AND CURRENT PROPOSALS 2-3 (2017).
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Somalia, Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson intervened in
2010 to stop a military strike on Al Shabaab because he concluded they were
not an associated force of Al Qaeda.171 State Department Legal Advisor
Harold Koh came to the same conclusion, arguing that targeting non-Al
Qaeda affiliated members of Al Shabaab would be unlawful even though the
leadership of one of the largest factions within the organization had declared
allegiance to Al Qaeda and had “transnational ambitions.”172 The former
Ba’athists in Iraq may have once belonged to Saddam’s government or
military, but they have now joined a completely separate organization, with
separate aims. Linking ISIL to the Ba’athist regime would stretch the 2002
AUMF to such an extent that the government does not make this argument
in either the 2016 or 2018 White House reports or in litigation.
Accordingly, the 2002 AUMF does not provide authorization to use
military force against ISIL, and the government would not have been able to
keep Doe in military detention pursuant to that authority.
C. Authorization by Appropriation
The government also pointed to a string of appropriations related to the
fight against ISIL as proof that Congress has authorized the fight in Iraq and
Syria.173 The first of these is the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2015, which granted $5.6 billion for counter-ISIL
operations.174 The government also highlighted the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016, where the Explanatory Statement noted the threat
posed by ISIL and the movement of funds to enable the military to conduct
counter-ISIL operations, and the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2016, which noted that “defeating ISIL is critical to maintaining a
unified Iraq.”175 Yet none of these indicate an authorization comparable to war
against ISIL or declare that the 2001 or 2002 AUMF applies to this fight.
The 2015 appropriations act appears to have incorporated much of the funding
into the general Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding line, which
covers a broad range of overseas operations—not just the fight against ISIL.176
171 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Obama’s AUMF Legacy, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 628,
643 n.96 and accompanying text (2016) (citing SAVAGE, supra note 146, at 276-77).
172 SAVAGE, supra note 147, at 275, 277.
173 2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 15-16. The government states that the
“funding, oversight, and authorizing measures do not themselves authorize the military campaign
against ISL; rather, they confirm that the campaign is authorized by the 2001 AUMF and . . . the
2002 Iraq AUMF.” Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 24.
174 2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 6 n.26 and accompanying text.
175 Id. at 6 n.27.
176 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, div.
C, tit. IX, 128 Stat. 2130, 2285-95 (2014). The government refers to $5.6 billion authorized under the
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Approximately $1.6 billion was appropriated directly for use against ISIL but only
in the context of the Iraq Train and Equip program, allowing the U.S. military to
train and equip vetted groups in the fight against ISIL.177
The 2016 appropriations bill continues the provision of funds for the
Train and Equip program,178 and allows for the reimbursement of expenses
for coalition allies in the fight against ISIL and in Afghanistan.179 The
Explanatory Statement cited by the 2016 White House Report mentions the
rise of ISIL in conjunction with attacks in Paris, destabilizing actions by Iran,
and Russian aggression in Ukraine as reasons to ensure that the military and
Intelligence Community have the funding they need to anticipate threats.180
The statement notes that funding is being moved into the OCO funding
stream for operations in Afghanistan, increased theater security missions, and
to maintain a global presence, as well as for counter-ISIL operations; but it
does not define what those counter-ISIL operations are.181 The
appropriations bill itself only funds the Train and Equip program, making it
an inappropriate basis on which the Administration should ground its
authority for a broader conflict.182
Finally, in the 2016 NDAA, while Congress does express concern about
ISIL and highlights the importance of its defeat, the Act only states that the
U.S. should provide a mission, defense articles, defense services, and related
training to the government of Iraq and allied entities in the fight against
ISIL.183 The most explicit authorization for U.S. action against ISIL comes
from the 2015 NDAA, which authorizes the Secretary of Defense to “provide
assistance, including training, equipment, logistics support, supplies, and
services, stipends, facility and infrastructure repair and renovation, and
sustainment, to military and other security forces of or associated with the
Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other
local security forces” in order to defend Iraq against ISIL.184
Act “for the express purpose of carrying out specific military activities against ISIL in Iraq and
Syria” in the 2016 White House Report. See 2016 WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 6 &
n.26. There is no indication that the general amounts authorized under OCO funding are meant to
confirm any authorization against ISIL.
177 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, div. C, tit. IX, 128 Stat. at 2290.
178 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-113, tit. IX, 129 Stat. 2242, 2386-87 (2015).
179 Id. tit. IX, 129 Stat. at 2383.
180 H. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 114TH CONG., CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS
ACT, 2016, at 289 (Comm. Print 2016).
181 Id.
182 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, tit. IX, 129 Stat. at 2386; H. COMM. ON
APPROPRIATIONS, 114TH CONG., supra note 178, at 289.
183 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (2016 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 11492, § 1223(a), 129 Stat. 726, 1049 (2015).
184 Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2015 (2015 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1236(a), 122 Stat. 3292, 3558–3559 (2014).
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None of these is an explicit authorization to use force against ISIL that would
lead one to understand that it came with an unmistakable authorization for
detention as an incident of war.185 The Supreme Court has emphasized the
importance of being explicit when authorizing via appropriations.186 In Ex parte
Endo, the Court stated that when attempting to authorize through appropriation,
“the appropriation must plainly show a purpose to bestow the precise authority
which is claimed,” and Congress cannot do that if a lump sum appropriation is
made to an “overall program of the Authority and no sums were earmarked for
the single phase of the total program” in question.187 This need for explicit
wording is especially important in areas of “doubtful constitutionality” because
such an authorization “requires careful and purposeful consideration by those
responsible for enacting and implementing our laws.”188 By appropriating funds
to the general OCO account, the appropriations cannot show a specific purpose.
It does not matter that Congress authorized and appropriated funds for
the Train and Equip program to counter ISIL. That cannot be taken as a
broader authorization for military force. The Constitution delegated to
Congress the ability to use a sliding scale for how much force can be
authorized—from war to letters of marque and reprisal.189 Just as the
President could not authorize the seizure of ships sailing from French ports
when Congress had only authorized the seizure of ships sailing to French
ports,190 the President cannot authorize combat operations against ISIL when
Congress has only authorized the Train and Equip program.
Given that Congress has not authorized the use of force against ISIL
through appropriations and has not authorized the fight against ISIL through
the 2001 or 2002 AUMFs, there was no act of Congress providing authority
for the military to detain Doe outside of the judicial process. To do so would
be a violation of the Non-Detention Act.191 The government will similarly be
confined to the traditional judicial process if it gains custody of any of the
remaining American SDF prisoners.
IV. ARTICLE II AUTHORITY
Lacking congressional authority, the government also made an appeal to
the powers inherent under Article II of the Constitution that are afforded to
the President as Commander in Chief. The government contends that
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (plurality opinion).
WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 62, at 226.
Id. (quoting Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 303 n.24 (1944)).
Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2018).
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because it has the independent authority to deploy military forces around the
world, the President can detain combatants for as long as U.S. forces are
engaged on a given battlefield.192 Specifically, the government points to
historical practice, noting that the executive has used military force
repeatedly without congressional approval in recent decades—most recently
in Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2017.193 Because U.S. forces were fighting against
ISIL in Syria, the government argued that the U.S. military could detain Doe
as a “fundamental incident of waging war” until hostilities ended, U.S. forces
left the theater of operations, or the military was able to arrange a release of
Doe in a way that did not endanger U.S. forces.194
This expansive interpretation of executive power undermines the clear
writing of the Constitution and the intentions of the Founding Fathers. In
his famous Youngstown concurrence, Justice Robert Jackson warned against
expansive claims of “inherent” presidential power since the Founders “knew
what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative
action, [and] knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation.”195
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war and to
issue letters of marque and reprisals.196 “There is little evidence that . . . the
Framers intended more than to establish in the Presidency civilian command
of the armed forces during wars declared by Congress . . . .”197 This is because
the Framers wanted to move away from the powers held by the British king
and his ability to declare and direct war.198 The Framers were intentional in
their use of separation of powers throughout the Constitution in order to let
each branch check the judgment of the others.199 By incorporating this
separation of powers in foreign policy with regards to the power to declare
war, the Framers sought to break the link they saw between war power and
“executive (monarchical) authority.”200 James Wilson captured this desire
when he noted that this system of separation of powers in foreign affairs
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27-28 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
HENKIN, supra note 48, at 45.
Id. at 45-46.
As James Madison explained,
Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges,
whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter
functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the
sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws.

STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 21 (2013) (quoting 15 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, 24 MARCH 1793–20 APRIL 1795, at 71 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1985)).
200 Id. at 23.
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would “guard against” hurrying into war because “[i]t will not be in the power
of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for
the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large.”201
The Founding Fathers did not view the Declare War Clause in a narrow
technical, international law sense, but instead viewed it expansively as
authorizing the nation to enter into hostilities of varying intensities.202 Each
of the first three American presidents sought authorization from Congress
for actions less than full scale war:
George Washington emphasized that he did not have independent power to
use military force against hostile tribes on the Western frontier. President
John Adams did not dispute that the quasi-war with France needed
Congress’s approval . . . . President Thomas Jefferson acknowledged that
Congress’s approval was required to go beyond defensive measures with
regard to Tripoli.203

This consistent interpretation provides guidance on when the President can
use force abroad.
This does not mean that the President must get congressional
authorization for every use of military force. The President also maintains
the ability to respond to direct threats to the country. The Founders clearly
intended for the President to have the ability to repel attacks against the
U.S.204 and “it is plausible that limited military operations to rescue or protect
U.S. citizens abroad, so long as the operations do not involve material
challenges to or material engagement with the territorial sovereign, would
not amount to initiation of war.”205 This understanding would allow the
President to conduct rescue operations for Americans held hostage, conduct
noncombatant evacuation operations of American civilians trapped in combat
zones, and intervene to disrupt a terrorist plot against the United States. But
this would not extend to committing U.S. forces to long-term combat
engagements overseas without congressional approval.
The argument from practice holds that this history and the clear text of
the Constitution is not the final arbiter. Instead, when the President uses
force abroad without congressional approval, he creates precedents that
expand his scope of legal authority for independent actions.206 This is due to
Fisher, supra note 53, at 13.
GRIFFIN, supra note 199, at 35.
Michael D. Ramsey, Constitutional War Initiation and the Obama Presidency, 110 AM. J. INT’L
L. 701, 703 (2016) (footnotes omitted).
204 Fisher, supra note 53, at 13.
205 Ramsey, supra note 203, at 704.
206 Curtis A. Bradley & Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Interactive Dynamic:
International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 705 (2016).
201
202
203
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the historic gloss that practice places on the Constitution when “systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never before questioned . . . mak[es] as it were such exercise of power
part of the structure of our government.”207 Curtis Bradley and Jean Galbraith
note the use of these executive actions as precedents by the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) to create a framework that OLC uses to justify further
executive action.208 For example, in justifying the use of force against Libya
in 2011, OLC stated that “the President has the power to commit United
States troops abroad, as well as to take military action, for the purpose of
protecting important national interests, even without specific prior
authorization from Congress.”209 In doing so, OLC pointed to the use of force
in Libya (1986), Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1993–1995), Haiti
(1994, 2005), and Yugoslavia (1999), which all occurred without congressional
authorization, as indicating the right of the executive to utilize a broad
constitutional power in using force.210 Additionally, the Supreme Court has
noted that “[i]n separation-of-powers cases this Court has often ‘put
significant weight upon historical practice.’”211
Yet there are reasons to doubt that this gloss is fully appropriate in this
context. First, it is not clear that unilateral presidential use of force is a
“systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
the Congress and never before questioned” to the degree that its supporters
portray it.212 Most of the military actions taken since Vietnam have been done
either with congressional approval, to rescue U.S. citizens, or to respond to
an attack on U.S. forces or facilities, eliminating their relevance in
demonstrating a more expansive Article II power under historical gloss.213
And Congress has not been silent when the executive has acted outside of
these limited circumstances.214 In 2011, Congress rejected an authorization to
use force against Libya by a vote of 123–295.215 Congress also rejected a

207 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
208 Id. at 706.
209 Auth. to Use Military Force in Libya, 2011 WL 1459998, at *6 (O.L.C. Apr. 1, 2011) (internal
quotations omitted).
210 Id. at *7.
211 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089-90 (2015).
212 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-611 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
213 See Ramsey, supra note 203, at 717 app. (listing presidential uses of force from 1975–2008).
214 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411, 466 nn.236-239 and accompanying text (2012) (describing congressional
resolutions to support such actions that were defeated and resolutions expressing opposition to such
actions that passed).
215 H.R.J. Res. 68, 112th Cong. (2011); 157 CONG. REC. H4549-H4550 (daily ed. June 24, 2011)
(Vote Roll No. 493).
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resolution to authorize the use of force in Kosovo in 1999.216 Requiring
Congress to overturn the executive use of force by passing a resolution
explicitly denying authorization or denying funding would turn the
constitutional requirement on its head—mandating a 2/3 vote in each
chamber of Congress to stop a war initiated unilaterally by the President.217
Instead, when the President acts, it must be based on a grant of power from
the Constitution—“one cannot derive an ought from an is.”218 The traditional
arguments for applying a historical gloss on constitutional interpretation and
applying a doctrine related to congressional acquiescence do “not accurately
reflect the dynamics of modern congressional–executive relations” and are “an
especially inapt description of congressional behavior.”219 As Justice Jackson
noted in Youngstown, “[p]arty loyalties and interests, sometimes more binding
than law, extend [the President’s] effective control into branches of government
other than his own and he often may win, as a political leader, what he cannot
command under the Constitution.”220 Thus, what the President may be able to
achieve politically does not provide adequate justification for turning the
constitutional order upside down.
Yet even if the President were to have Article II authority to use force
against ISIL, either to protect U.S. forces in Iraq and the Middle East or to
prevent attacks against the United States and its citizens, the President still
lacked authority to keep Doe in military detention indefinitely. Justice
Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown sets out a framework by which the courts
regularly evaluate separations of powers cases.221 When the President acts
with congressional authorization, his authority is at its maximum; when the
President acts in the absence of any indication from Congress, he is in a “zone
of twilight” in which the authority to act beyond the President’s own Article

216 S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999); 145 CONG. REC. H2384-H2385 (daily ed. Apr. 28,
1999) (Vote Roll No. 99).
217 As Peter Raven-Hansen explains,

The constitutional rule the Framers enacted was that peace continues until Congress
speaks, not that war goes forward unless Congress speaks . . . . The opposite rule shifts
the burden of going forward . . . and presents at least the mathematical possibility that
just thirty-four Senators . . . and the President could make war.
Peter Raven-Hansen, Constitutional Constraints: The War Clause, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND
THE POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES, supra note 35, at 35.
218 Id. at 31.
219 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 214, at 414.
220 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
221 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (“Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme
provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area.”); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“The proper framework for
assessing whether executive actions are authorized is the three-part scheme used by Justice Jackson
in his opinion in Youngstown.”).

122

University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online

[Vol. 167: 91

II powers is unclear, but may depend on the “imperatives of events”; and
when the President acts in opposition to the will of Congress, his power is at
its lowest and he can only act within his own Article II powers minus any
powers Congress has over the issue.222
In the present case, Congress has acted and restricted the President’s
authority by passing the War Powers Resolution and the NDA.223 The War
Powers Resolution requires the President to terminate the use of the U.S.
military abroad “unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a
specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has
extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a
result of an armed attack upon the United States.”224 As detailed in Part III,
Congress has not provided specific authorization for the fight against ISIL,
and there has been no extension or attack preventing Congress from meeting.
With well over 60 days running since the commencement of operations against
ISIL in 2014, even if the President had initial authority to combat ISIS, the
President has long been in Youngstown category III when considering the
ongoing operations against ISIL. To whatever degree Article II proponents
dismiss the earlier arguments in this Part, the War Powers Resolution is a clear
action by Congress to restrict executive overreach. Without authority to wage
the war against ISIL, the President will also lack the incidental authorities that
could come with it, such as the detention of prisoners.
Meanwhile, the NDA restricts the President’s ability to detain Americans
such as Doe indefinitely. The government contends that the NDA only applies
to civilian prisons and civilian detentions and does not apply to the military
because it falls under the criminal code and replaced a broad civilian detention
authority.225 This conflicts with the history of the statute. While it was passed
in order to replace a broader civilian detention authority, it was also passed with
the intent to prevent military detentions like those imposed against American
citizens of Japanese descent during World War II.226 This linkage to military
detentions makes it clear that Congress sought to provide protections for any
citizen facing detention, not just those facing civilian detention.227 Given the
restriction in the NDA on the President’s authority to detain, the indefinite
military detention of Doe occurs under the third category of Justice Jackson’s
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2018); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1549 (2018).
50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 19, at 27 n.28. The government has argued this in
previous military detention cases as well. E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004)
(plurality opinion).
222
223
224
225

226
227

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542-43 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 543.
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Youngstown framework. With the President at his lowest level of authority, his
Article II powers cannot override the restrictions of the NDA, meaning that he
cannot detain Doe without an act of Congress.228
With the President lacking authority to use military force against ISIL
either through Congress or his own Article II powers, the indefinite detention
of a U.S. citizen is not permissible.
CONCLUSION
Without legal authorization for war against ISIL under either
congressional action or inherent Article II authority, the government faced
significant risk of defeat in litigation over Doe’s habeas petition. The prospect
of releasing someone while so much evidence pointed towards him being a
member of ISIL is disconcerting.229 Given his training and knowledge, it is
likely that most Americans would not want him walking free. However, the
government likely did not want to risk a setback for its war powers and
instead chose to set Doe free. The United States reached this point because
of a failure of the legislative and executive branches. Instead of holding Doe
in military detention in Iraq, away from the battlefield in Syria, the
government could have transferred him back to the United States for a trial
under federal criminal law. The U.S. court system has a successful track
record prosecuting those who provide material support to a terrorist
228 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). While the argument has not been raised elsewhere, the government
could contend that the presumption against extraterritoriality restricts the reach of the NDA to
conduct occurring within the United States. See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561
U.S. 247 (2010) (holding that a presumption against extraterritoriality applies unless Congress
clearly expressed a contrary intent). However, even if a court concluded that the NDA did not
prohibit the United States government from seizing and detaining U.S. citizens abroad, two factors
would help courts reach a conclusion that leaves the analysis in this Comment unchanged. First, the
right to seek habeas relief and force the government to provide a justification for holding a citizen
turns not on a broad notion of territorial sovereignty but instead on “the practical question of ‘the
exact extent and nature of the jurisdiction or dominion exercised in fact’” by the government. Rasul
v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 482 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Mwenya, [1960] 1 Q.B. 241, 303 (Eng.) (Lord
Evershed MR)). The U.S. government held control of Doe under its own power and was using its
own laws to keep him detained—giving him a right to claim habeas. Second, the Jackson framework
outlined in Youngstown allows for congressional will to be implied. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Even if not an express prohibition on
government action abroad, the NDA appears to provide an implied expression of congressional will
that the executive only detain those citizens it has been authorized to detain. This implicit expression
can be seen in the fact that: 1) the NDA was passed during a time when the presumption against
extraterritoriality was seen as obsolete, see William Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 85, 86 (1998), and (2) to conclude otherwise would risk
executive detention of American citizens abroad without legislative authorization—conduct
Congress gave no indication of wanting to carve out of the NDA’s broad language.
229 See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text (detailing the evidence the government has
presented to argue that Doe was an ISIL fighter).
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organization and is more than competent to handle the case of a U.S. citizen
accused of supporting ISIL, as is now underway in the cases of Clark and
Kuzu.230 Alternatively, Congress could have authorized the use of military
force against ISIL, which would have carried the authority to detain enemy
combatants along with it.231 When it stormed into the international scene in
2014, ISIL posed a serious and dire threat to the government of Iraq. ISIL
also demonstrated a willingness to kill civilians en masse, threaten Americans,
inspire attacks against the U.S., and support attacks against U.S.-allied
nations in Europe. Congress could have made an argument to the American
public that this was a threat that needed to be countered and voted on an
ISIL-focused AUMF. But Congress failed to act.
The courts should not wade into this debate in order to voice their
thoughts about the policy of fighting ISIL, but they must not shy away from
adjudicating the legality of the fight in order to determine whether American
citizens can be held without trial.
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